FIRST

AMENDMENT-DEFAMATION-PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL MAY
RECOVER PRESUMED AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES WITHOUT A
SHOWING OF ACTUAL MALICE-Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-

moss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
Until 1964, the cause of action for defamation evolved
through the common law into a labyrinth of'complex rules and
technicalities,' often reflecting the ongoing tug-of-war between
the free speech rights of defendants and the rights of plaintiffs to
their good reputations. 2 In response to the general confusion in
the law of defamation, the United States Supreme Court, conI A cause of action for defamation can take one of two forms-an action for
slander or an action for libel. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-

ter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; Note, Survival of Libel Actions-There Is Life After
Death in New Jersey, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 639, 639 n.2 (1985). The distinction
between the two different types of actions lies in the method of publication, which
can be either oral or written. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 112, at 785. If a
defamatory statement is communicated orally, a cause of action for slander exists,
while a written defamatory statement will give rise to an action for libel. Id. Libel is
per se actionable if the statement at issue is defamatory on its face. Eaton, The
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1975). Slander is per se actionable only if
the statement falls into one of four narrowly drawn categories: the commission of a
crime, the contraction of a loathsome disease, a matter that would adversely affect
the plaintiff's business, or an accusation of unchastity if the plaintiff is a woman. Id.
Libel per quod requires extrinsic proof of the statement's defamatory meaning unless the written statement falls into one of the four categories of slander per se. Id.
at 1354-55. Furthermore, a per se action presumes damages to the plaintiff's reputation, while a per quod action requires proof of special damages. See id. at 135556. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 112, at 785-97 (detailing and explaining the various types of libel and slander).
Many prominent authors have recognized that the common law of defamation
has become quite confusing. See id. § 111, at 771; Eaton, supra, at 1350. William
Prosser states: "[T]here is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no
sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had
a kind word..... " PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 111, at 771. Another noted author, Joel Eaton, had the following to say about the apparent confusion in the common law of defamation:
[T]he English common law of defamation slowly grew into a forest of
complexities, overgrown with anomalies, inconsistencies, and perverse
rigidities. It became thicketed with brambled traps for innocent defendants, crisscrossed with circuitous paths and dead ends for seriously
wronged plaintiffs, and enshrouded in a "fog of fictions, inferences, and
presumptions."

Eaton, supra, at 1350 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 740, 98 P. 281,
291 (1908)).
2 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-42 (1974); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-73 (1964) (both addressing free speech
rights of defendants and reputation rights of plaintiffs in defamation actions).
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cerned with the effect that the common law would have on the
first amendment rights of defendants, began to define the constitutional parameters of defamation. The constitutional standards
for defamation formulated by the Court since New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan4 have focused primarily on the status of the plaintiff in
a defamation action.5 In defining these standards, the Supreme
Court often distinguished public figures from private individuals.6 During the 1960's and 1970's, the Court established that a
public figure must prove that a defamatory statement about him
was made with "actual malice" before he could obtain a judgment. 7 In sharp contrast, the Court required defamed private in-

dividuals to establish that a publication about them was malicious
only if they were seeking presumed and punitive damages.8
Recently, however, the Supreme Court altered this statusoriented approach and declared that the content of the alleged
defamation would determine whether the constitutional standard
of "actual malice" was applicable. 9 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ,'O the Court held that a jury may award a
private figure presumed and punitive damages in an action for
defamation if the defamatory statement did not involve a "matter
of public concern," regardless of whether the plaintiff proves actual malice."
The defendant in that case, Dun & Bradstreet, a prominent
corporation that specializes in compiling and selling data concerning the financial performance of businesses,1 2 issued a credit
report to five of its subscribers on July 26, 1976.13 The report
incorrectly stated that Greenmoss Builders, Inc. had voluntarily
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). But see
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (stating that constitutional standards for defamation apply "to all discussion and communication involving matters of general or public concern").
6 See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
9 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946
(1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
10 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
I Id. at 2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
12 Id. at 2941 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
13 Id. The credit information released by Dun & Bradstreet is compiled from
various sources. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66,
70, 461 A.2d 414, 416 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). The sources include
the individual company's annual reports, banks, creditors, and trade suppliers. Id.
3

4
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filed a bankruptcy petition.' 4 This misstatement occurred because of a mistake made by a seventeen-year-old high school student employed part-time by Dun & Bradstreet to review
bankruptcy petitions filed in the Vermont state courts. 15 In the
normal course of his duties, the student had inadvertently attributed a personal bankruptcy petition filed by a former employee
of Greenmoss Builders to the corporation itself. 16 At the time
Dun & Bradstreet released this inaccurate report, its files showed
that Greenmoss Builders had a positive net worth. 17 In fact, the
company's assets exceeded its secured liabilities by approximately $30,000.18

Although Dun & Bradstreet maintained standard procedures
to reduce the risk that a filing for bankruptcy would be inaccurately reported, the false report regarding Greenmoss Builders
initially escaped management's attention. 19 Normally, as part of
their procedures, Dun & Bradstreet would verify the financial status of any allegedly defunct corporation before releasing the potentially damaging information.20 In this instance, however, Dun
& Bradstreet released the false report concerning Greenmoss
Builders' bankruptcy to five businesses without attempting to
2
verify its validity. '
After the report was disseminated, the president of Greenmoss Builders learned of its damaging contents at a meeting with
his banker.22 Upon discovering the report's inaccuracies, the
president demanded that Dun & Bradstreet inform its subscribers of the true financial condition of Greenmoss Builders. 3 The
Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 2942 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
16 Id. Dun & Bradstreet paid the student $200 each year to review bankruptcy
petitions filed in Vermont. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
143 Vt. 66, 71, 461 A.2d 414, 416 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
17 Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 3, Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief]. In addition, the file showed that Greenmoss Builders enjoyed "a
good relationship with its bank" and that the company's financial rating was steadily improving. Id.
18 Id.
19 See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2942 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
14
15

20 Id.
21 See id.

22 Id. at 2941 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The Howard Bank, the primary
creditor of Greenmoss Builders, informed the company's president of the report's
existence during a discussion about future financing. See Respondent's Brief, supra
note 17, at 1. Shortly after the report's dissemination, the bank severed its relationship with Greenmoss Builders. Id. at 1, 4.
23 Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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president also requested that Dun & Bradstreet disclose the
names of the businesses that had received the inaccurate report
so they could be assured personally that his company was solvent. 2 4 Pursuant to established policy, however, Dun & Bradstreet refused to disclose the names of its customers.25
Nevertheless, the corporation admitted its error and promptly issued a retraction 26 of its original report on August 3, 1976.27
Despite Dun & Bradstreet's remedial action, Greenmoss
Builders remained dissatisfied and instituted an action for defamation in the Superior Court of Vermont. 2 8 After evaluating the
evidence, a jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory
damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. 29 Dun & Bradstreet
then moved successfully for a new trial. 30 Pursuant to an intervening interlocutory order, 31 however, the Vermont Supreme
Court affirmed the original award.3 2 It reasoned that nonmedia
defendants were not entitled to the level of constitutional protection provided to media defendants by prior United States
Supreme Court decisions. 33 Therefore, because Dun & Brad24

Id.

25

See id.

A retraction exonerates the defaming party if it is made immediately after the
defamatory statement and contains no "lurking insinuations, hypothetical or hesitant withdrawals, or new calumnies in disguise." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 116A, at 846. Dean Prosser notes that even if the retraction does not exonerate
the defendant, it should reduce the plaintiff's recovery because it "tend[s] to negative the 'malice' or outrageous conduct which is a basis for punitive damages." Id.
But cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[I]t is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge.
Denials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the
prominence of the original story.").
27 Dun &Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941 (Powell,J., plurality opinion). The corrective notice issued in this case by Dun & Bradstreet explained "that it was a former
employee of [Greenmoss Builders], not [the company] itself, who had filed the petition in bankruptcy, and that [Greenmoss Builders] 'continued in business as
usual.'" Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 71, 461
A.2d 414,416 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). Greenmoss Builders objected
to the retraction, however, because it felt the notice impliedly blamed the company
for the initial mistake. Id.
28 See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2942 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
29 Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 69, 461 A.2d
414, 415 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
30 Id. at 69-70, 461 A.2d at 415.
31 Id. at 70, 461 A.2d at 415. The superior court certified several questions of
law to the Vermont Supreme Court before the new trial took place. Id.
32 See id. at 78-79, 461 A.2d at 420-2 1.
'3 Id. at 74, 461 A.2d at 418. See generally Hill, Defamation and Pivacy Under the
First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1221-27 (1976) (analyzing distinctions
between media and nonmedia defendants).
26

1986]

NOTES

789

street was not a media defendant, the court held that Greenmoss
Builders was not required to prove that this particular publication was made with malice in order to recover presumed and punitive damages. 34 Furthermore, the state supreme court held
that Vermont did not recognize a qualified common law privilege
for inaccurate credit reporting.35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 1983.36 The Court subsequently affirmed the jury's
award of presumed and punitive damages, but it did so for different reasons than the Vermont Supreme Court.3 7 The United
States Supreme Court refused to rely on the fact that Dun &
Bradstreet was a nonmedia defendant;3 8 rather, the Court held
that a private individual must prove malice in order to recover
presumed and punitive damages only if the alleged defamation
involved a matter of public concern. 9
Prior to the 1960's, the tort of defamation was confined almost exclusively to the realm of the common law.40 Not surprisingly, the varied interpretations by state courts caused the law of
defamation to develop into an extremely complex tangle of rules
and presumptions. 4 ' Nevertheless, one thing remains clear: the
common law almost invariably favors the defamed plaintiff.4 2 For
example, the common law raises a rebuttable presumption that
every defamatory statement is false.4 3 In addition, the mere
existence of a defamatory statement creates an irrebuttable presumption that the plaintiff's reputation has been harmed.44 Fi34 Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 73-75, 461
A.2d 414, 417-18 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
35 Id. at 76, 461 A.2d at 419. In contrast to the Vermont court's stance on this
issue, a majority ofjurisdictions have adopted a qualified privilege for credit reporting. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 115, at 828-29; Maurer, Common Law
Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. L. J. 95, 99-105 (1983).
36 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
37 See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2942 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
38 See id. at 2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
39 Id. at 2948 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
40 See generally Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371,
372-90 (1969) (setting forth history of libel law). Merin notes that all Thirteen
Original Colonies adopted a civil cause of action for libel. Id. at 376.
41 See supra note 1 (summary of common law of defamation).
42 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1353 (outlining factors favoring plaintiff at common
law).
43 Id.
44 Id. In his article, Eaton offers the following justification for the presumption
that any defamatory statement has damaged the plaintiff's reputation:
Identifying and locating those persons in the community who may think
less highly of the plaintiff because of the publication is difficult, espe-
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nally, at common law, a defamed plaintiff may recover punitive
damages upon a showing of malice, which is defined as spite or ill
will. 45
The United States Supreme Court entered this area of the
law for the first time in 1964.46 In its landmark decision in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 7 the Supreme Court attempted to

strike a workable balance between the common law of defamation and the first amendment guarantee of free speech.48 In that
case, the New York Times had published a paid advertisement that
solicited funds for the civil rights movement in the South. 49 The
advertisement attributed several examples of brutality and harassment to the Montgomery, Alabama police.50 These alleged instances of police brutality contained a number of factual
inaccuracies, 51 and the Montgomery County Police Commissioner instituted a suit against the New York Times in the Alabama
state courts.52 A jury assessed $500,000 in damages against the
newspaper, and the Alabama appellate courts subsequently affirmed this award. 53
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
cially when the defamatory statement has been indiscriminately circulated. And once located, it is the rare witness who will admit to the
plaintiff or testify in court that his attitudes toward the plaintiff have
changed as a result of the publication, when by doing so he admits that
he changed his opinion without determining the truth or falsity of the
statement.
Id. at 1357; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) ("Under
the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication.").
45 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1353 n.15.
46 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The opinion stated,
"We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct." Id. at 256.
47 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
48 See id. at 270-73.
49 See id. at 256-57. Approximately 394 copies of the advertisement entered Alabama, and 35 copies were circulated in Montgomery County, the plaintiff's residence. Id. at 260 n.3.
50 See id. at 257-58.
51 See id. at 258-59.
52 Id. at 256.
53 Id. Although the award was founded on well-settled common law principles,
Professor Tribe notes that "the inescapable conclusion was that Alabama's 'white
establishment' had taken the opportunity to punish The New York Times for its
support of civil rights activists." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1212, at 633 (1978).
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reversed the determination of the Alabama courts.54 The
Supreme Court held that the common law of defamation improperly restricted the first amendment rights of free press and free
speech in this case.5 5 The Court reasoned that a contrary result
would escalate the fear of costly litigation and lead to "self-censorship," thus "dampen[ing] the vigor and limit[ing] the variety
of public debate." 56 Noting the "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials, '

57

the Court established a new

standard for recovery when the plaintiff in a defamation action is
a public official.58 The new standard, known as the New York
Times rule, 59 required the public official6" to prove with "convincing clarity" 6' that the defamatory statement was related to his of-

ficial conduct and that it "was made with 'actual malice.' "62
The Court later extended the New York Times rule to "public
figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.63 The Curtis Publishing
54

New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 264-65.

55 See id.

56 Id. at 279. But see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422,
424 (1975) ("[New York] Times privilege has failed to prevent self-censorship primarily because it does little to reduce the cost of defending against libel claims").
57 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
58 See id. at 279-80, 283.
59 See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 1, at 1367.
60 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the meaning of the term "public official." See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (" 'public official'
designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for
or control over the conduct of governmental affairs").
61 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285-86.
62 Id. at 279-80. The Court defined "actual malice" as "knowledge that [the
statement] was false or. . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.at
280. The common law, on the other hand, defined malice as "spite or ill will." L.
TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-12, at 634-35 n.21. Professor Tribe notes that the lower
courts often confused these standards. Id. § 12-12, at 635 n.21. The Supreme
Court eventually resolved this confusion and specifically stated that the common
law standard does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of "actual malice." See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n. 18 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). In the interim between New York Times Co. and Rosenbloom, the Court
provided a variety of definitions of actual malice. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970) (proof of malice mandates more than a
showing "of falsehood and general hostility"); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 732 (1968) ("recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to
doubt the veracity of the [statement] or [its] accuracy"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (malice requires "high degree of awareness of... probable
falsity").
63 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court decided both Curtis Publishing and a compan-
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case defined a public figure as an individual who thrusts himself
into a public controversy or who receives continuing public scrutiny and possesses the ability to rebut the defamatory statement. 64 Although the Court could not agree on the exact level of
constitutional protection a defendant should enjoy, 65 this decision ultimately required public figures to prove that a defamatory
statement relating to "public issues and events" was made with
actual malice.66 This standard applied to a much broader group
of potential plaintiffs than the rule enunciated in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, which was confined to government
officials criti67
cized for the performance of their duties.
After these two cases, it appeared that the status of the plaintiff would determine whether the constitutional standard of actual malice would apply in a defamation action. 68

In 1971,

ion case, Associated Press v. Walker, in a single opinion. See Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S.
at 135 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion). Justice Harlan, writing for four members of
the Court, stated that libel actions by public figures should be tested under standards similar to the New York Times rule. See id. at 155 (Harlan,J., plurality opinion).
In a concurring opinion, however, Chief Justice Warren unequivocally stated that
he would apply "the New York Times standard in the case of 'public figures' as well as
'public officials.'" Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
64 See id. at 154-55 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion). More specifically, Justice
Harlan stated that a public figure
may have attained that status by position alone . . . [or] by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the
"vortex" of an important public controversy... [or by] command[ing]
sufficient continuing public interest and . . . sufficient access to the
means of counterargument to be able "to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies" of the defamatory statements.
Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The Court later refined this test and
recognized three types of public figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 345 (1974); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-13, at 643-44 (summarizing
three categories of public figures). A person is "a public figure for all purposes" if
he has achieved "general fame or notoriety in the community." Gertz, 418 U.S. at
352. An individual may also be deemed a public figure if he " 'voluntarily inject[s
himself] into a public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.' " L. TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-13, at 644 (misquoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345). Finally, a person may become a public figure involuntarily. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345. For example, a suspect arrested for committing a particular crime is considered a public figure with respect to comments and news reports about the arrest. L.
TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-13, at 644.
65 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1392 (noting this disagreement among the members of the Court).
66 See Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Eaton notes
that the Curtis Publishing case extended the New York Times rule to public figures.
Eaton, supra note 1, at 1393.
67 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1393 (comparing New York Times Co. and Curtis Publishing decisions).
68 See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 420
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however, the Court abruptly switched its emphasis from the status of the plaintiff to the content of the alleged defamatory statement. 697 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,7o Justice Brennan, in a
plurality opinion, held that the New York Times requirement of actual malice applied not only to statements concerning public
figures, but also "to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern."' 7' The plurality noted that
the primary interest of the community lies in the reported event
itself.72 The public, Justice Brennan observed, "focus[es] . . . on

the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety." 73
The other members of the Court, however, refused to accept
Justice Brennan's reasoning. 74 In a persuasive dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall noted that all human occurrences are arguably in the public's interest. 75 He argued that Justice Brennan's
approach would result in numerous ad hoc determinations of
whether a given issue is sufficiently important to a particular
community. 76 Consequently, he maintained that the plurality's
approach was unworkable 77 and that "the appropriate resolution
of the clash of societal values [in media defamation cases] is to
restrict damages to [the plaintiff's] actual losses. "78
In 1974, the Supreme Court adopted Justice Marshall's argument that the courts are ill-equipped to determine whether a
statement sufficiently involves the public interest. 79 Thus, the
Court re-established the status of the plaintiff as the critical consideration for constitutional protection of defamatory state(9th Cir.) (famous baseball player's status as a public figure mandated proof of actual malice before he could recover for alleged libel), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840
(1968). But see Branson & Sprague, The Public Figure - Private Person Dichotomy: A
Flight from First Amendment Reality, 90 DICK. L. REV. 627, 631 (1986) (even in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the "Court cared more about the public interest involved

than the status of the persons discussed").
69 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
70 403 U.S. 29 (1971).

71 Id. at 43-44 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
72 See id. at 43 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
73 Id. (footnote omitted).

74 See id. at 59 (White, J., concurring); id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 7981 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 80-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 81 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
78 Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
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ments.8 ° In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 81 a private individual,
Elmer Gertz, sought recovery for injury to his reputation resulting from an article appearing in a national magazine.8 2 The Seventh Circuit applied Rosenbloom and required a showing of actual
malice by the plaintiff because the content of the article related to
a matter of public concern. 83 Although Gertz proved that the article's statements were defamatory, he was unable to establish
that they were published with the malice necessary to recover in
the action.84
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit's decision and held that the New York Times
standard of actual malice is not wholly applicable when a private
individual is defamed by a national magazine. 5 The Gertz Court
specifically reaffirmed the view that the level of protection available to a defendant in a defamation action depends upon the status of the plaintiff.86 The Court determined that Mr. Gertz, a
private individual, should recover even if he could not establish
that the statements were made with actual malice.8 7 In so holding, the Court reasoned that a private individual, unlike a public
figure, lacks the necessary access to the media for an effective
rebuttal.88 Furthermore, the Court recognized that private citizens rarely introduce themselves into a public controversy for the
purpose of influencing the outcome.8 9
Finally, the Court balanced the state's interest in protecting
an individual's reputation against the first amendment rights of
See id. at 344-46.
81 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
82 See id. at 325-27. The article about Gertz appeared in the monthly magazine
of the John Birch Society, American Opinion, which was published by the defendant.
Id. at 325. Gertz claimed that the article had defamed him by implying that he had
a criminal record, alleging that he had helped plan the 1968 Democratic Convention demonstrations in Chicago, and accusing him of involvement in the "Marxist
League for Industrial Democracy." Id. at 326.
83 See id. at 330-31.
84 Id. at 331-32.
85 See id. at 348-49. Although the Court recognized that the New York Times rationale was not "wholly inapplicable to the context of private individuals," it reasoned that "the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to reputation" outweighed the competing first amendment
values in this situation. Id.
86 See id. at 342-44. The Court defined three categories of public figures to
whom the New York Times rule would apply. See id. at 345; see also supra note 64
(setting forth Court's definitions).
87 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
80

88

Id. at 344.

89 Id. at 345.
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the defendant.9" In this instance, the Court determined that the
strong and legitimate state interest in protecting Mr. Gertz's reputation outweighed the first amendment interests of the defendant. 9 ' As a result, the Gertz Court held that the stringent malice
requirements of the New York Times decision were inapplicable
when the plaintiff was a private figure. 92 The Court then empowered the states to establish their own standards for recovery by
private persons in defamation actions, provided that they refrain
from imposing liability without a finding of fault.9" The Court
also declared that an award of either presumed damages or punitive damages would still require proof of actual malice. 94
Although Gertz clarified many of the constitutional parameters of defamation actions, 95 it remained unclear whether the
holding applied only to media defendants or whether it applied
to private, nonmedia defendants as well.96 Several lower courts
and commentators suggested that the opinion was limited to media defendants because the Court continually referred to "the
media" 97 when enunciating the constitutional standards for defamation. 98 Furthermore, at least one author noted that the law of
90

See id. at 348-49.

91 See id.

See id. at 348, 351.
Id. at 347. Professor Tribe notes that the publisher of a defamatory statement
about a private individual will generally be held to a negligence standard. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-13, at 639 n.7. The states, however, are free to establish
a more stringent standard. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188
Colo. 86, 98-99, 538 P.2d 450, 457 (1975) (actual malice standard imposed when
alleged libel involves matter of public interest).
94 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. The Court noted that the states lack a legitimate
interest in securing awards for plaintiffs who suffer no actual injury. Id. at 349.
Furthermore, because the competing interest of the defendant was grounded in the
first amendment, the Court ruled that the state remedies for defamation should
"reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate [reputational] interest
involved." Id. at 349.
95 See L. TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-13, at 641 (noting that "Gertz narrowed the
range of situations in which constitutional constraints left the common law tort
wholly untouched").
96 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1416-17.
97 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (referring to media); id. at 353 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (same); id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (same).
98 See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 1, at 1416-17. Professor Tribe notes that "[tihe
majority opinion may imply by its repeated references to the 'media' that the application of the Gertz rules is not required in defamation actions against non-media
defendants." L. TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-13, at 639 n.6. In addition, Joel Eaton
concludes that "[t]he rules fashioned in Gertz clearly were meant to apply only in
defamation suits against the press. For the present at least, private individuals defamed by non-media defendants may journey into the common law forest in search
of recompense and vindication without encountering the constitutional army." Ea92
93

796

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:785

defamation lacked a constitutional standard for recovery when a
private individual was defamed by a nonmedia defendant. 9 The
Supreme Court squarely faced such a situation in Dun & Bradstreet.' In deciding the case, however, the Court rejuvenated its
prior emphasis on the content of the allegedly defamatory statement. 0 1 The Court held, contrary to Gertz, that presumed and
punitive damages could be awarded to a private individual without a showing of malice when the 1alleged
defamation involved a
02
matter outside the public interest.
The Dun & Bradstreet case created a sharp division among the
members of the Supreme Court.10 3 In fact, the Justices failed to
ton, supra note 1, at 1417; see also Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,
635 (1975) (Court is concerned with the press's ability "to insure bold and vigorous
prosecution of the public's business"). But cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent worth of... speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
690-91 (1972) (news reporter required to appear before grand jury has no greater
first amendment rights than ordinary citizen).
The fact that defamation actions involving nonmedia defendants rarely reach
the Supreme Court provides one reason for the lack of a clear constitutional standard in this area. See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1404 & n.228. In his article, Eaton
explains why cases reaching the United States Supreme Court almost exclusively
involve the media:
[Media defendants] publish vast amounts of information which inevitably contain a vast number of errors; their wide dissemination of an error
is more likely to aggravate the defamed than would neighborhood gossip; and their sizeable financial resources make them more attractive
targets for suit. In addition, judgments against media defendants are
generally much larger than those against individuals, making the economic gamble of an appeal acceptable. Finally, media defendants possess greater resources to pursue several appeals, and are more apt to
press their constitutional claims on principle than are non-media
defendants.
Id. at 1405 n.228.
99 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1417.
100 See Court Strengthens Libel Plaintiff'sHand, N.Y. Times,June 27, 1985, at B8, col.
1. The article noted that "[iut had been expected that the Court would decide, for
the first time, whether the news media and all other speakers enjoy the same protections under the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press." Id. at col. 2. The American Bar Association Journal also
commented that "[tihe long-awaited decision was expected to resolve whether the
First Amendment limits on libel suits against news media were also available to
nonmedia defendants like Dun & Bradstreet." Gora, Supreme Court Report, 71
A.B.A.J., Nov. 1985, at 116, 123; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S.
485, 492-93 n.8 (1984) (Court impliedly acknowledged it would consider libel rules
for nonmedia defendants in Dun & Bradstreet).
101 See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
102 See id. at 2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
103 See id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting "diversity of considered
opinions").
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agree on a majority pronouncement and issued a total of four
separate opinions. 0 4 Justice Powell announced the decision of
the Court and authored an opinion in which Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor joined."0 5 In addition, both Justice White and
Chief Justice Burger filed separate concurrences, 0 6 and Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
dissented. 107
In his plurality opinion, Justice Powell observed that the
Court had previously imposed constitutional limitations on the
development of the common law only in cases dealing with public matters.' 08 For example, he pointed out that the defamation
involved in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan concerned one of the
major issues of that time-the civil rights movement in the
South-which was clearly a matter of public interest. 0 9 In addition, Justice Powell observed that the Gertz Court had dealt with a
matter of "undoubted public concern" when it had established
the constitutional standards for defamation actions brought by
private figures against media defendants." 0 He therefore posited that the issue for determination in Dun & Bradstreet was
whether Gertz barred the recovery of presumed and punitive damages when a defamatory statement involving a matter of purely
private concern was made without malice."'
Justice Powell interpreted Gertz as an accomodation between
the " 'strong and legitimate . .

.

interest' " in compensating a

private plaintiff for harm to his reputation and the competing interest in protecting the first amendment rights of the defendant."12 He maintained that Gertz had resolved the tension
between these interests in favor of the plaintiff by permitting
compensation for actual injury to a private individual's reputation even in the absence of a showing of malice."23 Justice Powell
also observed, however, that Gertz involved the dissemination of
104 See id. at 2941-48 (Powell,J., plurality opinion); id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 2948-54 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2954-65 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).

105

Id. at 2941.

See id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring).
See id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 See id. at 2943-44 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
109 Id. at 2943 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
110 Id. at 2944 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
'M See id. at 2941, 2944 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
112 Id. at 2944 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348).
113 See id. Justice Powell stated that the Gertz Court had weighted the scale in
favor of private plaintiffs because "they generally lack effective opportunities for
rebutting [defamatory] statements [made by the media]." Id.
106
107
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information important to the public."14 Thus, he concluded that
automatically relevant with rewhat was relevant in Gertz was not
15
speech."
private
spect to purely
Justice Powell emphasized that all speech does not necessarily receive equal constitutional protection.' 16 He reasoned that
speech on matters of public interest "is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection' " and is thus entitled to "special concern." 17 Purely private speech, Justice Powell determined, "is of
less First Amendment concern."" 8 Accordingly, he stated that
the Court should refrain from restricting the common law of defamation if the "concerns" of free public debate addressed in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz are not present." 9
Justice Powell then attempted to strike a workable balance
between the competing interests at stake in all defamation cases
involving statements of purely private concern. 120 Emphasizing
that the state interest in protecting an individual's reputation was
"strong and legitimate, 12 1 he observed that a citizen's right to
this protection " 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'

"122

Justice

Powell then reasoned that the state's interest in shielding individual reputations outweighed the first amendment interest in protecting purely private speech. 123 He therefore concluded that
presumed and punitive damages could be awarded without a
See id.
115 See id. at 2944 & n.4 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Justice Powell stated that
Gertz's disapproval of presumed and punitive damages except in cases involving actual malice was consistent with the result in Dun & Bradstreet. Id. He maintained
that the key factor in Gertz-a matter of public concern-was absent in Dun & Bradstreet. See id.
116 Id. at 2945 & n.5 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The plurality noted that obscene speech and fighting words have received no constitutional protection. Id. at
2945 n.5 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Justice Powell also observed that commercial speech merits only reduced constitutional protection. Id.
117 Id. at 2945 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
118 Id. at 2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146-47 (1983)).
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 Id. at 2945 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348).
122 Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
123 See id. at 2945, 2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Justice Powell found the
state interest " 'substantial' relative to the incidental effect [presumed and punitive
damages] may have on speech of significantly less constitutional interest." Id. at
2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
114
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showing of actual malice when a private person was defamed by a
statement that did not concern the public interest. 24
Justice Powell next addressed whether the credit report issued by Dun & Bradstreet was actually a matter of purely private
concern. 125 Employing a method of analysis set forth in Connick
v. Myers, 126 Justice Powell considered the "content, form, and
context"' 12 7 of Dun & Bradstreet's credit report and noted the
report's similarity to commercial speech. 128 He reasoned that a
reduced level of protection was appropriate in this case because
the speech at issue was solely in the financial interest of Dun &
Bradstreet and its customers.1 29 Furthermore, he observed that
the credit report was circulated among only five subscribers, who
were contractually bound not to disseminate its contents. 130
Therefore, Justice Powell concluded that there was "simply no
credible argument that credit reporting requires special protection to ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open' ,,;13' he thus held that the report did not
3 2
involve a matter of public concern.
ChiefJustice Burger filed an opinion concurring in the judgment of the Court. 13 3 In the Chief Justice's opinion, the Gertz
decision was not controlling because it was limited to situations
in which "the alleged defamatory expression concerns a matter
of general public importance."'' 34 In contrast, the Chief Justice
reasoned, "the expression in question here relate[d] to a matter
Id.
See id. at 2947 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
126 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
127 Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
128 See id. at 2947 & n.8 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Although Justice Powell
refused to hold that the credit report constituted commercial speech, he stated that
-many of the same concerns that argue in favor of reduced constitutional
protection in [the] areas [of advertising and commercial speech] apply [to credit reports]
as well." Id. at 2947 n.8 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
129 Id. at 2947 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
130 Id. Because the report was issued to only five subscribers, the plurality reasoned that it did not involve a " 'strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information.' " Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). Justice Powell also noted that credit
reporting was "hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation"
because "it [was] solely motivated by the desire for profit." Id.
131 Id. (citing New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270).
124

125

132

Id.

133

See id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

134

Id.
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of essentially private concern." 135 Therefore, he agreed that
Greenmoss Builders could collect punitive damages absent a
showing of malice.' 3 6 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice exhibited
considerable dissatisfaction with the Court's decision; he asserted that Gertz should be overruled, thus allowing defamed3 7private citizens to seek redress under the common law rules.1
Chief Justice Burger also questioned the wisdom of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.' 3 ' The Chief Justice maintained that the decision had equated actual malice with "reckless disregard of the
truth."'3 9 Thus, he argued that the requirement of actual malice
should be deemed satisfied if "the exercise of reasonable care"
would have disclosed the falsity of a defamatory statement. 40
Because the Court had not taken this approach, however, the
Chief Justice concluded
that the New York Times decision should
4
be re-examined.' '

Justice White also wrote a separate opinion concurring in the
Court's judgment.'4 2 Like Chief Justice Burger, he believed that
Gertz should be overruled and the common law retained when a
private individual sues for defamation. "43 Moreover, throughout
his opinion, Justice White criticized the Supreme Court's involvement in the area of defamation. 14 He asserted that the Court
had been "engag[ing] in severe overkill" in attempting to achieve
its goal of "protecting the press from intimidating
damages lia145
bility that might lead to excessive timidity."'
In addition, Justice White opined that the Court's excursions
into the law of defamation had resulted in "two evils."' 146 First,
he noted that a false statement about a public official will remain
unchallenged unless the official is able to prove actual malice-an
extremely difficult and expensive burden for most plaintiffs to
135 Id.

See id.
See id. Chief Justice Burger agreed with Justice White's conclusion that Gertz
should be overruled. Id. Justice White stated that a rejection of Gertz would result
in the application of the common law rules to private plaintiffs. Id. at 2950 (White,
J., concurring).
138 See id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1'9 Id.
140 See id.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 2948-54 (White, J., concurring).
143 See id. at 2950, 2952 (White, J., concurring).
144 See id. at 2949, 2952 (White, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 2952 (White, J., concurring).
146 Id. at 2951 (White, J., concurring).
136

137
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satisfy. 14 7 Thus, Justice White reasoned, as a result of the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan holding, the public would continue to be
misled as "the stream of information about public officials and
public affairs is polluted."' 48 SecondJustice White criticized the
fact that the actual malice standard must be met before the public9
4
official can recover for any resulting damage to his reputation.1
He argued that this requirement permits the "destruction" of a
public official's reputation and professional life even when a5 rea0
sonable investigation might have disclosed the actual facts.,
Justice White then addressed the Supreme Court's decision
in Gertz. 5 ' He noted that under Gertz, a private plaintiff defamed
by the most outrageous lie would be without a remedy and the
false statement would remain uncorrected unless the plaintiff was
able to prove fault on the part of the defendant.' 5 2 Assuming
that this burden was met, Justice White noted, the private plain153
tiff would still have to prove actual damage to his reputation.
He observed that the common law had viewed this latter requirement as "difficult, if not impossible, to discharge.' 1 54 Justice
White maintained that the standards set forth in Gertz were unfair
to private plaintiffs; thus, he reaffirmed his dissenting position in
that case and advocated the retention of the common law rules in
all cases in which a private individual is defamed. "
Justice White next pointed out that although Gertz had established two constitutional requirements for recovery in defamation actions by private figures, 156 the plurality had rejected only
one of these: the requirement of a showing of actual malice
57
before a plaintiff can recover presumed and punitive damages.
147 Id. at 2950 (White, J., concurring). Justice White maintained that the plaintiff
has very little chance to offset the damage done by a false statement. Id. He stated
that " '[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive
the prominence of the original story.' " Id. at 2951 (White, J., concurring) (quoting
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)). Thus, Justice White
concluded that a public official's access to the media was "a decidedly weak reed to
depend on for the vindication of First Amendment interests." Id. at 2950 (White,
J., concurring).
148 Id. at 2951 (White, J., concurring).
149 See id.
150 See id. Justice White maintained that the New York Times requirements often
lead to "grossly perverse results." Id.
151 See id. at 2951-52 (White, J., concurring).
152 See id. at 2951 (White, J., concurring).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 2952 (White, J., concurring).
156 See id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
157 See id.
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Justice White noted that the plurality had failed to consider
whether the additional Gertz requirement of fault on the part of
the defendant was also necessary before the plaintiff could recover.' 58 Consequently, Justice White reasoned, Justice Powell's
opinion necessarily implied that all the standards enunciated in
Gertz are inapplicable when the alleged defamation does not in5 9
volve a matter of public concern.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan first observed that
none of the various opinions filed expressed the views of a majority of the Court with respect to the important question
presented. 60 He then analyzed Justice Powell's treatment of
Gertz. 16 1 Justice Brennan disputed Justice Powell's contention
that the Gertz decision was premised on speech that involved public matters. 6 To the contrary, Justice Brennan stated, Gertz specifically sought to avoid a judicial determination of whether a
matter was sufficiently in the public's interest to warrant protection.163 He posited that the Gertz Court had believed that the relative importance of a public issue should not be left to judicial
interpretation." Therefore, he declared, Gertz had reinstated
the view that the constitutional protection granted to an alleged
65
defamatory statement would turn on the status of the plaintiff. 1
Justice Brennan maintained that it would be "incongruous" for
the Court to eliminate "the protection against presumed and punitive damages by reference to a judicial judgment as to whether
'
the speech at issue involved matters of public concern." 166
Justice Brennan then stated that none of the opinions of the
other Justices offered any guidelines for determining whether a
subject is sufficiently in the interest of the public to warrant conSee id.
See id.
Id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In contrast to Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White, Justice Brennan declared that the Court's "solid allegiance" to the
principles enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was not undermined by its
fragmented approach to the "idiosyncratic facts" of the Dun & Bradstreet case. Id.
161 See id. at 2959-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 See id. at 2959-60 & n.1 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 See id. at 2959 n. 11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164 See id. at 2957 n.5, 2959 n. 11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 See id. at 2957 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 2959 n. 1I (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the concurring opinion of Justice White reached a similar conclusion. Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with Justice White's contention that
" 'Gertz was intended to reach any false statements ... whether or not [they] implicate[] a matter of public importance.'" Id. (quoting id. at 2952-53 (White, J.,
concurring)).
158
159
160
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stitutional protection. 67 Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's
holding as containing merely a "garnish of substantive analysis"
and as offering only "a smorgasbord of reasons why the speech"
at issue was not in the public's interest.' 68 He similarly criticized
Justice White for deciding without analysis or explanation that
Dun & Bradstreet's credit report merited no constitutional protection. 169 Furthermore, Justice Brennan believed that the plurality's reliance on Connick v. Myers was misplaced because that
decision's distinction between public and private matters was expressly limited
to the context of governmental employment
70
situations.

Justice Brennan further argued that even if the Court were
to assume that Gertz applies only to matters of public interest, the
credit report at issue in Dun & Bradstreet was sufficiently important to require first amendment protection.' 7'

He maintained

that the dissemination of financial data comports with the principle that the availability of economic information from diverse and
competing sources is necessary for the financial well-being of the
public. 172 In addition, Justice Brennan reasoned that the public
possesses a valid interest in bankruptcy filings because they are
effectuated through judicial mechanisms and become part of the
public record. 73 Moreover, he noted that an announcement of a
local company's bankruptcy may be of great concern to residents
of that community. ' 74 Thus, he believed Gertz should apply to the
instant facts even under Justice Powell's interpretation of that
case.

In support of his conclusion, Justice Brennan disposed of
Justice Powell's reasons for according the credit report reduced
See id. at 2959, 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169 Id.
170 See id. at 2962 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171 See id. at 2961, 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed, "Our economic system is predicated on the assumption that human welfare will be improved
through informed decisionmaking." Id. In addition, he stated that "[t]he . . . information Dun & Bradstreet disseminates in its credit reports makes an undoubted
contribution to [the] private discourse essential to our well-being." Id.
173 Id. (citation omitted).
174 Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that a
credit report "certainly falls within the range of speech that Gertz sought to protect
from the chill of unrestrained presumed and punitive damage awards." Id. (footnote omitted).
167
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constitutional protection. 76 He attacked Justice Powell's belief
that the parallels between the credit report at issue and commercial speech justified a limited level of constitutional protection."'
Justice Brennan noted that the Court had consistently held that
speech on economic matters or in the economic interest of the
78
speaker should receive substantial first amendment protection. ,
He further maintained that the Court had permitted greater regulation of commercial speech only when the speech at issue constituted pure advertising. 79 Justice Brennan defined pure
advertising as "an offer to buy or sell goods and services or encouraging such buying and selling."' 8 0 Stating that the credit report in this case was clearly not pure advertising, Justice Brennan
reasoned that it should not lose any of its constitutional protection simply because it was conveyed for a price. 181
Justice Brennan viewed Justice Powell's reliance on the confidentiality and limited circulation of the credit report as the
"linchpin" of the plurality's analysis.' 8 2 He flatly rejected this
idea and reasoned that confidential circulation by itself does not
render the subject matter outside of the public interest.18 3 In
support of his position, Justice Brennan suggested that credit reporting should be analyzed in the aggregate. 84 He noted that
Dun & Bradstreet undoubtedly issues thousands of credit reports
85
to similar limited groups of investors and financial institutions.
Hence, Justice Brennan feared that if Dun & Bradstreet remained
to
unprotected from presumed and punitive damages, its efforts 86
chilled.'
be
would
subscribers
its
to
supply credit information
Justice Brennan also noted the blunt effect that presumed
8 7
and punitive damages would have on protected expression.'
He argued that well-settled principles of first amendment juris176

See id. at 2960-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

177 See id. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Justice Brennan stated that
178 See id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"[s]peech about commercial or economic matters ... is an important part of our
public discourse." Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As a result, he observed,
"commercial speech ... receives substantial First Amendment protection." Id. at
2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
179 Id. at 2962, 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
181 Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
182 Id. at 2964-65 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 2965 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
184 See id.
185

Id.

186
187

Id.
See id. at 2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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prudence dictate that "fine instruments" and narrowly drawn
standards be employed when regulating speech.' 88 Justice Brennan further observed that the cornerstone of Gertz was that state
remedies for defamatory falsehoods should reach no further than
necessary to protect the state's legitimate interest in preserving
the reputations of its citizens. 189 He maintained that the first
amendment must be given a large measure of deference even in
cases that do not involve speech concerning public issues or public figures.' 90 In any event, regardless of whether Dun & Bradstreet's credit report was "sufficiently central to First
Amendment values to require actual malice as a standard of liability," Justice Brennan concluded that it deserved protection
from unregulated awards of presumed and punitive damages. 19 1
The various opinions in the Dun & Bradstreet decision provide
clear evidence of the division among the current Supreme Court
Justices regarding the sensitive issue of defamation. Justice Powell's holding that Gertz applies only to defamations involving matters of public concern clearly ignores the Court's prior treatment
of this area of the law.' 9 ' In addition, Justice Powell has apparently rejected the principle set forth in Gertz that judges should
not decide on an ad hoc basis whether a publication addresses
issues of public interest. 193 Thus, the Dun & Bradstreet opinion
mandates a case-by-case determination of whether the controversy has invoked the public interest sufficiently to warrant constitutional protection. 194 Unfortunately, judges will once again
become the final arbiters of what issues are matters of public concern and are thus worthy of constitutional protection.195 In addi188 See id. (citations omitted).
189 See id.
190 See id.

191 Id. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that Greenmoss
Builders should be allowed to recover compensatory damages without a showing of
actual malice, but he maintained that the malice requirement should apply to the
claim for presumed and punitive damages. Id. at 2965 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 See id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan accused Justice Powell of "depart[ing] completely from the analytic framework and result of [Gertz]."
Id.
'93 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346; see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
In Firestone, the Court stated, "It was our recognition and rejection of this weakness
in the Rosenbloom test which led us in Gertz to eschew a subject-matter test for one

focusing upon the character of the defamation plaintiff." Id. at 456.
See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2945-46 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
195 See id. at 2959-60 & n. 11 (Brennan,J., dissenting).Justice Brennan questioned
'94

whether "a distinction can and should be drawn between matters of public concern
and matters of purely private concern." Id. at 2959-60 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In
addition, he noted that "[d]istrust of placing in the courts the power to decide what
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tion to being largely subjective, these judicial determinations will
place unnecessary pressure on an already overworked court
system.
It is also distressing that the plurality and concurring opinions in Dun & Bradstreet offer so little guidance for determining
whether speech is sufficiently in the public's interest to merit protection from the chilling effect of presumed and punitive damages.' 9 6 This lack of guidance is particularly unsettling because
the credit reports issued by Dun & Bradstreet about American
businesses are arguably matters of public concern.' 9 7 As Justice
Brennan noted, a single bankruptcy can have a devastating effect
on many lives and on the economic well-being of an entire region.'98 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that if what is
good for a major corporation is good for America, then "'what
may be wrong at [that corporation]' must be a legitimate area of
public concern." 9 9 The fact that the credit report at issue in Dun
& Bradstreet defamed a relatively small corporation does not undermine this principle. A credit reporting company is in no position to predict which of its reports will be deemed by the courts
to be of public concern. Hence, the fact that credit reporting
companies will be unable to predict defamation liability accurately may lead to self-censorship as many companies try to
" 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.''200
Additionally, in Dun & Bradstreet,Justice Powell balanced the
state's strong and legitimate interest in the reputations of its citizens against the defendant's first amendment interest. 20 ' He determined that the credit report did not merit constitutional
protection from punitive and presumed damages because Dun &
speech was of public concern" led the Gertz Court to reject the Rosenbloom approach
in the first place. Id. at 2959 n.1 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 See id. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed that both
the plurality opinion and Justice White's concurrence "propose[d] an impoverished
definition of 'matters of public concern.' " Id.
197 See id. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198 See id.
199 Note, Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff,69 COLUM. L. REV. 1496, 1507-08 (1969).
200 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958)); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 53, § 12-12, at 634 ("a great danger of selfcensorship arises from the fear of guessing wrong"). The common law recognized
this chilling potential and established a conditional privilege for inaccurate credit
reporting. See supra note 35 (noting that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted
this privilege).
201 See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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Bradstreet's first amendment interest was "less important. '20 2
This analysis contains several flaws, however, because both the
state's interest and the defendant's interest in the controversy
were erroneously derived.
In determining the magnitude of the state's interest, Justice
Powell relied heavily on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
Rosenblatt v. Baer.2 °3 In Rosenblatt, Justice Stewart reasoned that
"[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." '20 4 Greenmoss Builders is a corporation, however, and it
lacks the type of reputational interest that the common law protects by allowing presumed damages. A corporation has no emo0 5
tions or feelings and cannot suffer the kind of "psychic injury ' 2
that the law of defamation attempts to prevent. 20 6 Therefore, the
language relied on by Justice Powell-"the essential dignity and
worth of every human being" 2 07 -is simply inapplicable when the
defamed plaintiff is a corporation. 20 8 Furthermore, as Justice
202 Id. at 2945 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); see also supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text (setting forth Justice Powell's reasoning).
203 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Justice Powell relied upon Justice Stewart's opinion to
support his conclusion that the state's interest in protecting private reputations is
"strong and legitimate." See Dun &Bradstreet, 105 S.Ct. at 2945 (Powell,J., plurality opinion).
204 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
205 Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to
PersonalDefamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 992 (1975); see Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("Being the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.");
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 111, at 779 ("A corporation is regarded as having no reputation in any personal sense .. ");Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation
Plaintiffas First Amendment "Public Figure"."Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IowA L. REv. 35, 52
(1982) (" 'The business corporation has no personality, no dignity that can be assailed, no feelings that can be touched.' ") (citation omitted). Dean Prosser also
notes, however, that a corporation "has prestige and standing in the business in
which it is engaged, and language which casts an aspersion upon its honesty, credit,
efficiency or other business character may be actionable." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 111, at 779 (emphasis added).
206 See Fetzer, supra note 205, at 51-52.
207 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
208 Note, supra note 205, at 992. The author notes that Gertz was premised on
protecting the individual's interest in his reputation. Id. He maintains that if the
value of a corporation's good name is substituted for an individual's reputational
interest, the constitutional balance "shifts dramatically." Id. The author concludes
that "the value of uninhibited speech and press should far outweigh the purely
pecuniary value" associated with a corporation's good name. Id.
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Brennan observed, any damage suffered by Greenmoss Builders
can readily be measured in financial terms. 20 9 Therefore, an
award of presumptive damages in place of actual damages may
overcompensate a plaintiff such as Greenmoss Builders and thus
violate the clear policy that free speech should be chilled only
when absolutely necessary.2 10
In addition, Justice Powell's determination that Dun & Bradstreet's first amendment interest was "less important" than the
state's interest in protecting reputations minimizes the increas2 t
ingly pervasive role that big business plays in everyday life. '
Like the Federal and state governments, major businesses have
an important effect on the political, economic, and social lives of
all Americans. 2 12 Because American businesses "are not amenable to the restraints of the political process, ' 21 3 however, public
opinion and criticism may be the only method of influencing the
conduct of this country's corporate giants. 21 4 Therefore, because
government and business both have pervasive effects on the lives
of Americans,2 15 any critical examination of either should be
granted substantial protection. Moreover, legislative involvement in the act of incorporation and in the subsequent operations of companies has led many courts and commentators to
reason that American corporations have assumed the risk of public scrutiny.2 16 Thus, a compelling argument may be made that
See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2964 n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
212 See id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
213 See id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
214 See id. If ownership of a corporation is spread among a large number of stockholders, the company may be even less responsive to the wishes of a majority of its
owners. See Note, supra note 199, at 1507.
215 See Note, supra note 199, at 1506-07.
216 See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (large corporation deemed a public figure because of extensive regulation of
its activities by state departments of insurance and SEC); Trans World Accounts,
Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (corporation considered a public figure with respect to a matter under investigation by the Federal
Trade Commission); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F.
Supp. 947, 955-56 (D.D.C. 1976) (all corporations are public figures because they
lack any privacy interest); see also Fetzer, supra note 205, at 60-65 (noting extensive
regulation of corporations); cf. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d
Cir. 1980) (corporation deemed a public figure because of extensive advertising
and "regular and continuing access to the channels of communication"). But see
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589 (1st Cir. 1980)
(noting that corporations generally have no greater access to the media than private
individuals). See generally Note, In Search of the CorporatePrivate Figure: Defamation of
209
210
211
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Dun & Bradstreet's reports deserve heightened first amendment
safeguards.
Perhaps the most unsettling element of the Dun & Bradstreet
decision, however, is the lack of clear guidelines regarding the
level of constitutional protection that will be accorded future defendants in defamation actions. As a result of Dun & Bradstreet's
emphasis on content, the distinction between media and
nonmedia defendants relied on by the lower court may no longer
have constitutional significance. 2 7 Furthermore, Justice Powell
failed to clarify whether fault must still be shown-as prescribed
by Gertz 2 ' 8 -before actual damages may be awarded for defamatory statements regarding matters of private concern. Indeed, he
expressly rejected the idea that malice must be proven before punitive damages may be awarded in cases such as Dun & Bradstreet.21 9 Accordingly, his broad distinction of Gertz might also
imply that actual damages may be awarded absent proof of fault
in defamation cases involving wholly private matters. In any
event, the willingness of the Court to create additional doctrinal
distinctions at the expense of clarity indicates that the Court is
the Corporation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 339 (1978) (discussing application of Gertz standard to corporations).
217 See Dun &Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2959 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the plurality opinion had "eschew[ed] the media/nonmedia distinction." Id. In addition, he argued that such a distinction would be "irreconcilable
with the fundamental First Amendment principle that '[t]he inherent worth of...
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend on the
identity of its source.' " Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)). Furthermore, Justice Brennan maintained that a media/nonmedia "distinction would likely be born an anachronism."
Id. at 2957-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He reasoned that "transformations in the
technological and economic structure of the communications industry" have
blurred the distinctions between media and nonmedia entities. Id. at 2958 n.7
(Brennan,J., dissenting). But see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct.
1558 (1986). In Hepps, the Court held that "where a newspaper publishes speech of
public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without . . .
showing that the statements at issue are false." Id. at 1559. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, hinted at a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants, stating that the Court need not "consider what standards would apply if the
plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant." Id. at 1565 n.4.
218 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting Gertz's requirement of some
sort of fault); cf. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1559
(1986) (recognizing the vitality of the fault requirement when a private figure sues a
media defendant).
219 See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2948 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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insensitive to the need to offer clear, workable guidelines and is
unwilling "to come to rest in the defamation area. 220
David B. Katz
220

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

